Norms provide socially constituted reasons for actions. In terms of rationality they define what makes sense to do in a view of an actor's goals in a certain situation or what is adequate in view of (conventional) social rules. In terms of morality they define what is blameworthy and wrong or permissible and praiseworthy in light of superordinate moral principles of fairness or justice, care or solidarity (Frankena, 1973) , or in terms of a norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960) . In general, norms provide justified reasons for actions. Not following or violating norms leads to certain feelings, such as feelings of regret in case of prudential norms or feelings of shame and guilt in the case of violating moral norms.
In the context of our research we are interested in two types of moral norms: moral duties and interpersonal responsibilities. Moral duties, such as promise-keeping or truth-telling, have been seen as based on universal moral principles such as the justice principle (Kohlberg, 1984; Rawls, 1971) . Moral duties are seen to be obligatory for everybody and regulate actions that we owe to everybody equally. Interpersonal responsibilities are based on principles of care and beneficence (Gilligan, 1982; Hoffman, 2000) . They regulate sympathetic concern, empathy and altruism that from a moral point of view we do not owe to everybody equally. For example, expectations about behaviour in close relationships (Youniss, 1980) in particular involve special responsibilities of empathy and care that result from the long-term relationship, special feelings between the actors and the experience of reciprocity in the relationship.
Cognitive and affective aspects of normative action
Both moral and interpersonal norms serve the function of coordinating behaviour. The normative fact of having given a promise or standing in a long-term affective relationship constitutes a good and justified reason for self to act in accordance. By implication, the person to whom a promise has been given will expect the intended action or, similarly, a close friend will expect certain future behaviour. Norms imply coordinated expectations about behavior and feelings and define what we (rightly) expect from each other in specific situations. Concerning cognition, this implies in the actor the development of a theory of action with the ability to coordinate the perspectives of self and others. Concerning affect, it implies a motivational disposition to experience certain feelings in case of norm violations. These feelings are correlated in self and other (Gibbard, 1992) : when self as a norm violator has a reason to feel guilty, ashamed or embarrassed, other as a victim of violation has a reason to be angry and resentful or punish the norm violator and demand excuses and restitution. In the following I will discuss these cognitive and affective aspects from a developmental point of view.
The development of understanding of moral and interpersonal norms
In Kohlberg's (1976 Kohlberg's ( , 1984 theory of moral development the understanding of moral norms has been assessed in the context of reasoning about hypothetical dilemmas in which different moral obligations are in conflict. The most prominent example is the 'Heinz-dilemma' in which two legal norms, the right for life and the right for property, are in conflict. The questions of what is the morally right decision for Heinz, to steal a medication in order to save the life of his wife or to respect the property rights of a pharmacist, have to be reflected under various contextual conditions. Based on the answers to these questions from samples of persons at different ages, including a longitudinal study, Kohlberg defined different stages of moral reasoning as transformations of the understanding of fairness (Kohlberg, 1984 , Colby & Kohlberg, 1987 . Moral reasoning stages are increasingly more differentiated and comprehensive in terms of a person's understanding of the social perspectives of the actors involved and in terms of the understanding of the normative (justice) demands of the situation. Kohlberg has distinguished three levels, each with two sub-stages. At the first sub-stage of preconventional morality the person is focused on the perspective of the self. The evaluation of what is right is motivated by selfish interests, obedience to authority and fear of sanctions from authority in the case of norm violation. At the second sub-stage the perspectives of self and other can be coordinated. What is morally right is defined as a pragmatic reciprocity, but the interests of the self are predominant concerns. At stage 3 of the conventional level the self is understood as part of relationships, and empathy and care for others become dominant moral concerns. At the fourth stage, self and relationships are understood as parts of society, and the societal implications of norms and norm violation are in the focus. At the postconventional level conflicting claims are judged in light of social contracts, universal human rights and responsibilities.
Over time, Kohlberg's theoretical position has given rise to considerable criticism. This concerned the exclusive focus on the principle of justice as the defining criterion of morality, the theoretical definition of the stages and the assumption of structural homogeneity, the assumptions about the relationship between moral understanding and moral action and the role of emotion (see Keller, 1996) . Gilligan (1980) has designed a theory of moral development based on the principles of care and responsibility. Similar to Kohlberg's conception, in her developmental model early forms of morality were also seen to be selfish. However, research on empathy and altruism (Eisenberg, 1982 , Hoffman, 2000 has provided increasing evidence that the conception of preconventional moral reasoning with the predominant focus on self-interest is inadequately defined because empathy and sympathy play a role already in children's moral reasoning. In Kohlberg's theory altruism and empathy are the main concerns of the conventional stage 3. They have neither precursors at the preconventional level nor can they be adequately defined at the higher levels of moral reasoning. This issue has been discussed in particular in cross-cultural research including people from Asian cultures (Boyes & Walker, 1988; Eckensberger & Zimba, 1997) . Furthermore, even young children distinguish different types of norms and understand the validity of moral rules independent of authority rules, sanctions or self-interest (Gibbs & Widaman, 1982; Keller & Edelstein, 1993; Keller, Eckensberger & von Rosen, 1989; Nucci & Lee, 1993; Turiel, 1983) .
However, research has also documented that self-oriented reasoning decreases in the course of development, when the person becomes increasingly aware of interpersonal concerns (Eisenberg, 1982) . Similarly, Keller, Eckensberger & von Rosen (1989) documented both self-oriented and fairness/empathy types of reasons in children's arguments in a Kohlberg-dilemma. Keller (1996) could also show that empathic reasons increased in particular in early adolescence substantively. Thus, children seem to have a more differentiated moral reasoning than originally assumed and both fairness and interpersonal responsibility are part of moral reasoning.
Moral reasoning, moral action and feelings

Moral consistency
Concerning the relationship between moral reasoning and action, researchers assumed that the experience of necessity to act according to one's moral knowledge and to establish consistency between moral judgment and action has a developmental component (Keller & Edelstein, 1993; Kohlberg, 1984) . It is only in adolescence that a moral self is established that accepts obligations as binding (Blasi, 1980 (Blasi, , 2004 . In line with these developmental assumptions it could be shown that young children even in case of knowledge about obligations and responsibilities were guided by self-interest in decision-making in a morally relevant situation (Gerson & Damon 1978) . Keller & Edelstein (1993) documented that in particular adolescents established consistency between moral judgment and action choice in a morally relevant friendship-dilemma. Younger children frequently revealed a split between their action choice and what they judged as right in this dilemma-situation. However, later cross-cultural work by Keller and her colleagues revealed that this developmental assumption was true only for Western children whereas a Chinese sample did not show such inconsistency (this will be discussed below). Thus, other than developmental factors have to be taken into account in the relationship between moral judgment and action.
Moral feelings
Another line of research has explored feelings that an actor experiences after the violation of a moral rule. In the post-Kohlbergian area, feelings have been seen as an important indicator of moral development. From a cognitive perspective they indicate that a person has knowledge about a moral norm. From the perspective of motivation they indicate that a person is concerned about the norm-violation. Feelings in the case of a norm violation have been classified into two types: feelings of fear based on external sanctions and feelings of guilt and shame based on inner sanctions of a moral self. Only the latter have been seen as genuinely moral.
According to Kohlberg's theory, moral feelings are a relatively late achievement of stage 3 moral development in adolescence. More recent research on moral feelings with younger children has evidenced moral feelings much earlier in development. In cognitive-developmental research, children were presented with situations of moral rule violations of a child protagonist and were asked about whether this violation was right and how the protagonist felt in this situation. Research supported the assumption that, already, young children emphasized the validity of moral norms such as not hurting somebody or not stealing independent of authority rules or sanctions. However, when children were asked how the hypothetical violator would feel after a rule-violation only older children attributed ambivalent or negative feelings while five-year-olds mostly attributed positive feelings to the violator (Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988) . This finding was particularly surprising in view of the fact that even the youngest children were aware of the negative emotional consequences of the rule-violation for the victim (Arsenio & Lover, 1995) . Nunner-Winkler (1993) interpreted this 'happy victimizer effect' to indicate different developmental trajectories for moral knowledge and moral motivation. She concluded that knowledge about some fundamental moral norms such as not hurting somebody or not stealing is developed early and is universal, whereas moral motivation -as indicated by the awareness of moral feelings of the violator -is lagging behind the development of moral knowledge.
In a study using the same type of rule violations as in the previous studies Chinese children surprisingly did not show any age changes in the attribution of emotions to a hypothetical violator (Keller, Edelstein, Fang et al., 1996) . This was true even for the nine-year-old children. However, when the question was posed how the children themselves would feel if they had committed this violation, even the younger children attributed negative feelings to the self. We interpreted this finding such that the Chinese children differentiated between the hypothetical violator as a (bad) person committing a morally bad action and themselves as a (morally good) person who would not commit such a violation. This explanation was supported by the fact that the Chinese children frequently spontaneously rejected the rule violation and commented it negatively. Keller, Lourenço, Malti & Saalbach (2003) confirmed this self-other differentiation in a cross-cultural study comparing German and Portuguese children. They found a developmental change for both other and self, but negative (moral) feelings were significantly more frequently attributed if the child was asked to imagine the feelings in case self had performed the action. Furthermore, we could show that children distinguished how a rule violator would feel and how he or she should feel. Interestingly, all children knew that a rule-violator should feel bad after a rule violation. Thus, prescriptive moral knowledge about rule violations seems to be different from descriptive social knowledge. In two further studies Keller, Gummerum, Wang & Lindsey (2004b) interconnected deontic-reasoning about contract violation (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992) with the attribution of emotions to violator and victim of contract violations. This study again supported the finding that even the youngest children attributed negative feelings to the victim of a contact violation. In contradistinction, the feelings attributed to the violator were dependent on the context of the contract violation. In a situation of mother-child contract violation, chil-dren across ages attributed positive feelings more frequently than negative feelings. On the other hand, in a symmetrical peer relationship, feelings attributed to the violator showed the previously found age related changes. In addition, the intentionality involved in the situation seemed to be important. In the mother-child situation the child as rule violator undeservingly received a benefit, while in the peer situation the child as violator intentionally appropriated an undeserved benefit. In this study the two factors of relationship and type of contract violation could not be disentangled. Unfortunately, this result could not be replicated in a follow-up study in which Barrett, Keller, Takezawa & Wichary (submitted) experimentally controlled the effects of relationship (peer-parent and biologically related-non related) with the same type of contract violation. In this study, older children attributed negative feelings increasingly more frequently to the violator under all conditions. These findings support a more complex picture of emotion attributions than previously assumed. A recent study by Krettenauer & Eichler (in press ) with adolescents also showed that the attribution of moral feelings may be more context-specific than assumed, with different types of tasks producing different trajectories for the emergence of moral emotions.
In general, these findings support the notion that moral reasoning about norms and feelings is a multifaceted phenomenon. Even young children have different types of concerns available when they reason about the validity of moral norms, when they make choices in morally relevant conflicts and when they attribute feelings in case of norm violations. Thus, the type of situation or the type of relationship must be taken into account as important factors. Which aspects of a situation achieve predominance in moral decision-making and which feelings are elicited depend on development, the context of the situation and also on cultural influences. The following empirical study on obligations and responsibilities in close relationships takes such a broader framework into account when exploring the topics discussed above. In this study we address moral reasoning and moral emotions in the context of close relationships in a cross-cultural framework.
Close relationships: a cross-cultural framework
Children construct the meaning of moral obligations, such as promise-keeping and truth-telling, and of interpersonal responsibilities, such as concerns with the well-being of another person, in close relationships with parents and peers. The morally relevant expectations that govern people's interactions originate in self-other relationships and can be seen as products of the developmental transformations of the self-other relationship. Therefore, the understanding of relationships is intricately connected with the system of moral rules and it appears plausible to investigate the developmental origins of moral rule systems and a moral self within particular, intimate and affectively meaningful relationships (Keller, 1996; Keller & Edelstein 1993) . In agreement with Piaget (1965) , peer relations are seen as particularly well suited to explore the moral meaning of close symmetrical relationships. Among those, friendship has a most important status (Bukowski & Sippola, 1996; Keller & Edelstein, 1990; Selman, 1980; Youniss, 1980) . Friendship implies caring for the good of the friend, and gives rise to mutual expectations about how one ought to act and feel in order to maintain closeness in the relationship. Thus, the fact of being close friends provides normative reasons for actions and feelings. It involves sympathy and concern for another person and in particular in adolescence a deep mutual emotional sharing (Blum, 1980; Damon, 1977; Selman, 1980; Youniss, 1980) . Rather little is known about the development of friendship understanding across different cultures (Krappmann, 1996) . In Western cultures, close friendship is important across the lifespan. In China, friendship seems to be the only relationship of equality (Goodwin & So-Kum Tang, 1996) . On the other hand, the pattern of intimate friendship that is so characteristic of Western societies seems to have been less characteristic in China. According to Berndt (1993) , family ties and peer relations in general are emphasized more strongly than intimate friendship. Although the Chinese seem to incorporate group structure in the self-definition (as has also been described for the Japanese culture), it is a question whether close friendship has the same developmental significance for Chinese adolescents as has been documented for adolescents in Western cultures.
Cross-cultural research on moral development has shown important differences between persons from Western and Eastern cultures that have implications for the understanding of relationships. Indians were more concerned with issues of care and gave greater priority to interpersonal responsibilities whereas US Americans were more concerned with issues of justice, individual rights and personal choice (Bersoff & Miller, 1993; Shweder, Mahapatra & Miller, 1987) . Furthermore, Indians perceived interpersonal responsibilities as duties, while US Americans saw them as more voluntary. Similarly, in reasoning about moral dilemmas, Chinese persons frequently mentioned issues of interpersonal welfare and mutual benevolence which, in more elaborate forms, could not be adequately captured in Kohlberg's theory (e.g. Boys & Walker, 1988; Ma, 1988) . These cultural differences have been explained with a distinction between individualistic and collectivistic orientations (Triandis, 1990) . People in Western cultures have been described as valuing independence and individualism, compared with social identity and group responsibility in Eastern cultures (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) . Recently, various researchers have criticized that view, saying that cultures cannot be differentiated along one dimension (Turiel, 1998 ; this volume, Chapter 8), because they are complex systems that contain features of both individualism and collectivism. This is particularly true for modernizing societies.
Theoretical framework and expectations of the empirical studies
People do not consider moral obligations as strictly obligatory under all circumstances. They take the particular conditions of the situation into account when weighing different claims against each other. They also vary in their sensitivity for the moral aspects of a conflict situation, both developmentally and differentially. When they interpret the meaning of a situation and make a decision they may not spontaneously take into account the moral aspects of a situation, but may be concerned with other -selfish or pragmatic -aspects (Nisan, 2004) . Such a broader interpretive framework directs attention from moral competence--the focus of the Kohlberg tradition--to moral motivation (Edelstein & Noam, 1982; Nunner-Winkler, 1993) and the moral self (Blasi, 1980 (Blasi, , 2004 . In our research we raise the question that concerns that people take into account in their moral decision-making dependent on development, context and culture.
We argue that descriptive (social) and prescriptive (moral) reasoning are interconnected in the developing understanding of relationships and moral rules (Keller, 1996; Keller & Edelstein, 1991; Keller & Reuss, 1984) . Interpersonal and moral awareness and the commitment to moral norms are based on processes of perspective differentiation and coordination through which persons come to understand social reality in terms of psychological facts (what is the case) and in the light of normative standards of morality (what is right or what ought to be the case). We have described this understanding in the framework of a naive theory of action. In the course of development the categories or components of a naive theory of action are differentiated and coordinated and gain different meaning in the solution of action dilemmas. Descriptive social knowledge refers to the understanding of actions, persons, and relationships in terms of motives and justifications, consequences and strategies to maintain relationships. Prescriptive knowledge refers to the understanding that certain actions, goals or means to pursue them are allowed or prohibited, responsible or irresponsible in view of moral norms and interpersonal responsibilities. The violation of such normative standards gives rise to fear of external (e.g. punishment from others) or to internal sanctions (e.g. guilt/shame). Moral awareness of such violations requires acts of compensation, such as justifications or excuses in order to rebalance the relationship. Comparing children and adolescents from western (Iceland) and Chinese culture we expect that the intensive interpersonal and moral orientation of Chinese persons (Bond, 1996) sensitize them to the normative aspects of social relationships and action dilemmas. Moral inconsistency should be avoided and the violation of responsibilities should lead to the anticipation of guilt feelings more frequently in younger Chinese children compared to Icelandic children. We also assumed that the Icelandic children would be focused more on selfish/ hedonistic concerns and on contractual aspects of a situation, such as promise keeping. For the Chinese children we expected that empathy and altruistic responsibilities towards a friend and a stranger would be more dominant because of general concerns about group relationships and social harmony. Given the importance of close friendship in western cultures we expected that the close friendship would be more important for the Icelandic than for the Chinese children. For both groups we assumed however that close friendship would gain developmentally increasing salience.
Reasoning about relationships and norms: a comparison of Icelandic and Chinese children and adolescents
Children and adolescents from Reykjavik, Iceland (n=120) and from different rural ecologies (n=60), males and female, were assessed longitudinally at the ages of seven, nine, twelve and fifteen years (Keller, 1996) . They were compared with a cross-sectional sample of ninety same-aged children and adolescents in Bejing, China from three different ecologies, with partial longitudinal assessment of this sample. People were individually interviewed about various aspects of family, close friendship and promise-keeping in these relationships (see Keller, 1996; Keller et al., 2005) . In the following I will focus on the friendship context. This includes (1) the general understanding of close friendship (e.g. what is most important in close friendship; why is it important to have a close friend) and the norm of promise-keeping (e.g. why is it important to keep a promise; what happens if a person does not keep a promise given), and (2) situation-specific reasoning about a morally relevant dilemma in a close friendship (Keller, 1984; Selman, 1980) . In the dilemma the protagonist had to decide whether to keep a promise to a long-time best friend or to accept an interesting invitation from a child who is new in class and has no friends. The old friend did not seem to like this new child.
In the interview the different components of the naive theory of action had to be reconstructed in the following issues: definition of the problem, action choice and moral judgment; descriptive and prescriptive reasoning about choice and alternative in terms of motives and moral justifications; the consequences of the choice for self and others, in particular feelings of self and other in case of violation of obligations and responsibilities; and the strategies to compensate for consequences of such a violation (Keller 1984 (Keller , 1996 . The developmental levels of socio-moral reasoning were scored independently for the different issues. Reliability in age groups and cultures varied between 85 per cent and 95 per cent inter-rater consistency (see Keller 1996 Keller , 2004a . Table 7 .1 shows the developmental levels of perspective-differentiation and coordination in the general understanding of close friendship and the norm of promise-keeping. These developmental sequences are similar but not identical to those described in moral and friendship development. Concerning close friendship, children are first oriented towards mutual actions such as playing. At the next level, mutual feelings and a time dimension emerge. At the third level, generalized norms of reciprocity such as trust and reliability and interpersonal intimacy are in the focus. Concerning promise keeping, at the first level, external sanctions, rigid rule-orientation and stereotypic evaluations are emphasized. The last two aspects indicate a moral awareness that is not dependent on authority and sanction. At the second level, a coordination of perspectives of self and other emerges. Promise-keeping is seen as necessary to maintain relationships, and violating the obligation of promise-keeping leads to negative feelings of self (e.g. feeling bad) and the empathic awareness of others' negative feelings. Perspectives of self and other are coordinated such that it is understood that other will evaluate self negatively in this case. At the third level, trustworthiness of the person and mutual trust in the relationship are key concepts. Inner sanctions in terms of conscience regulate the actions of a moral self. This developmental sequence is not fully congruent with Kohlberg's definition of preconventional morality, in which morality is defined by external criteria such as fear of sanctions and obedience to authority at the first stage and instrumental exchange reciprocity at the second stage. Rather, our data support the assumption of a genuine moral understanding that is rooted in the positive motivation to maintain relationships. This understanding is gradually transformed by the ability to foresee the consequences of one's own actions for self and others and their (long-term) relationship and the awareness of a necessity to regulate actions in view of normative standards in order to maintain a close relationship, in particular close friendship (Keller & Edelstein, 1993) . Table 7 .2 shows the developmental levels of situation-specific reasoning about the two action choices (visiting friend as promised or going with the new child) in the dilemma in terms of practical (descriptive) and moral reasoning (motives and justifications) and reasoning about the consequences of violation of norms. Other as victim: feels bad, not good; Self as violator: feels good (because she likes to play with the friend/ because the movie is fun).
Cognitive-developmental analyses
Level 2: Self-reflexive-coordinated
Friend: has promised, not be a traitor; knowing each other long; always meeting this day; friend would be unhappy, insulted; New child: unique opportunity; last showing of the movie; new child has no friends; wanting to be friends with new child, helping new child.
Other as victim: feels unhappy; left out, disappointed; Self as violator: feels bad (because her or she is betraying friend, thinks about friend/thinks about new child who is left out); feels good: it is good/right to keep the promise/ meet the friend; friend can/will understand.
Level 3: Generalized norm of reciprocity
Friend: wanting to be a reliable and trustworthy friend, not destroy the intimate relationship, not hurt friend's feelings; New child: friend would understand decision, having a guilty conscience about leaving out new child who has no friends.
Other as victim: hurt feelings over breach of trust/intimacy; Self as violator: guilty conscience over breach of trust/of intimacy with friend; Positive feelings: feeling good/right because of the intimate friendship, one has been trustworthy.
Note: * reasons of protagonist/self for option 'friend' or 'new child'
The description of the levels shows that children use the categories of the naive theory of action in both general and situation-specific and descriptive and prescriptive reasoning. We also see that certain forms of motives and evaluations are connected with specific forms of consequences. When the normative dimension of the promise or of friendship is understood, negative feelings are seen as consequences of violating friendship responsibilities or altruistic obligations, and positive feelings arise when priority is given to responsibilities, in particular to close friendship. Thus, when children begin to understand that the friend feels bad as a consequence of the meeting with the new child (understanding the unintended consequences of choice for the other) negative feelings are attributed to the protagonist/self (coordination of perspectives of other and self in terms of emotions). As we will show below, these positive feelings do not emerge in the Chinese children. What is also not presented here is that children change their action strategies when they understand the normative implications of their actions. Given the previous example of stage 2 reasoning they would try to make their friend understand the norm violation by reference to either the special situation (such a good movie, last showing) or the neediness of the other child (he or she is alone and has no friends). But another possibility is to hide the norm violation by constructing an alternative obligation, for example with an explicit lie such as that one had to go downtown with the mother. In this case guilt feelings might emerge as a moral consequence.
The empirical analysis of the longitudinal Icelandic data revealed that the separately coded issues are highly interrelated and form hierarchically ordered developmental levels (see Keller, 1996) . The same sequence holds for the Chinese cross-sectional and also the longitudinal data. The seven-year-olds in general score at stage 1 and 2, the nine-year-olds score mostly at stage 2, the twelve-year-olds at stage 2 and 3, and the fifteen-year-olds at stage 3. This is consistent with other cognitive-developmental data (Selman, 1980) . Thus, the results support the assumption that the sequence of developmental levels which describes the cognitive organization in terms of an increasing differentiation and coordination of perspectives and awareness of the normative content of relationships and social situation is the same in both cultures. However, in spite of this similarity in socio-cognitive development a content analysis of the arguments illuminates that the motivational concerns of children and adolescents in the two cultures are rather different.
Content analysis of reasons
Content analyses of arguments about the dilemma included (a) the direction of people's choices (new child versus friend) in the context of practical and moral reasoning (What will the protagonist do/is this the right choice?) and (b) reasons offered for the options in practical and moral reasoning. The more differentiated reasons shown in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 were categorized in terms of four types of content that represent theoretically relevant and most frequent reasons for the two options. Two categories referring to the option 'new child' indicate self-interest (hedonism: hedonistic offers made by the new child) and altruistic responsibility (altruism: helping/being with somebody who is new in class). Two categories referring to the option 'old friend' indicate moral duty (promise: given to the friend) and friendship responsibility (friendship: concerns of friend). Inter-rater agreement for scoring content categories was above 90 per cent for all categories in the different age groups from the two cultures.
The main findings discussed below are based on statistically significant effects of log-linear analyses (see Keller et al., 1998 for a detailed description of the statistical methods and results). Figure 7 .1 shows the distribution of types of the four types of reasons for the options 'friend' or 'new child' in practical (what the protagonist will do) and moral reasoning (whether this is the right decision).
Practical decision
Option 'friend' Option 'new child'
Moral decision
Option 'friend' Option 'new child'* *No data were available for seven-year-old Icelandic children One salient cultural difference concerns the category of hedonistic self-interests as reasons for the option 'new child' in the practical decision. Across all four age groups the Icelandic children used this category much more frequently than the Chinese. As moral reason the category was used very infrequently in both cultures. In contradistinction, the category of altruistic reasoning was emphasized more strongly by the Chinese children, in both practical and moral reasoning. Closer inspection of this type of arguments revealed an interesting developmental phenomenon. The youngest children frequently mentioned a catalogue of rules for elementary school children that make it a duty to help somebody who is new in class (Döbert, 1989) . Thus, interpersonal responsibilities in the youngest children seem to be based, at least partly, in obedience to rules and authorities. This corresponds to moral heteronomy as defined by Piaget and Kohlberg. In contradistinction, in Western cultures care and responsibility have been seen as originating from empathy (Eisenberg, 1982) . Such empathy-based altruism is observed in older Chinese children who referred to others' state and feelings and to generalized norms of helping a person who needs to be integrated into the group. Overall, these findings are consistent with the cross-cultural findings discussed above, with people from Asian cultures being more concerned with interpersonal responsibilities while selfish concerns are more important for the western children.
The other two types of reasons for the option 'friend' were used equally frequently in practical and moral reasoning. However, cultural differences in both content categories changed over time and were stronger in the younger children than in adolescents. In agreement with the cross-cultural differences in the literature mentioned above, the Icelandic children were more frequently oriented towards the contractual aspect of promise-keeping, whereas the Chinese children more frequently referred to friendship responsibilities. Whereas in the Chinese sample the reference to the promise increased over time, in the Icelandic sample the reference to close friendship increased developmentally in the same way. Most interestingly, in adolescence no difference obtained in the use of the two categories. These results support the difference between a contractual and an interpersonal orientation that has been shown in previous research. However, different from this research there are developmental changes in these cultural differences.
Overall the results reveal an interaction of development and culture. They show that some cultural differences remain stable across time (self-interest versus altruistic responsibility) while others are changing over development (moral duty versus interpersonal responsibility). This reveals a more complex picture of cultural differences across development than previously shown in the literature.
Moral consistency and moral feelings
In the following we will compare practical and moral decision-making in order to see whether children establish consistency between moral judgment and action (see Figure 7 .2). The Icelandic children revealed an increasing developmental trend to opt for the close friend and to judge this choice as morally right. In particular the youngest Icelandic children revealed moral inconsistency by opting for the new child and evaluating this choice as morally not right. The Chinese gave priority to the close friend only in adolescence (nearly 90 per cent) and judged this decision to be right. In the three younger Chinese age groups an almost equal split between the two offers obtained, but nearly always the preferred option was judged as morally right. Thus, the Chinese children nearly never revealed a split between practical choice and moral judgment but they changed both the direction of choice and moral judgment in the course of development. This developmental trend supports the assumption that in both cultures adolescents feel closely connected with the friend. Consistent with the literature, responsibilities towards a close friend seem to be of central value particularly for adolescents (Bukowski & Sippola, 1996; Keller & Edelstein, 1990) . This may have to do with universal biological changes and the developmental task to achieve independence from parents in adolescence. Frequent conflicts with parents -which seem to happen not only in Western cultures -make peer relationships specifically important. But it should be kept in mind that this developmental convergence originates from different values in the two cultures. For the Chinese friendship becomes a predominant value only over time. For the Icelandic children, close friendship is a dominant moral value from the youngest age onwards. But the developmental task apparently is to give this value motivational priority against selfish interests and thus to establish consistency between moral judgment and practical choice. Keller & Edelstein (1993) had taken the findings from the Icelandic children as support of the assumption that moral consistency was a developmental phenomenon and that a moral self was established in adolescence. Because the Chinese did not show this developmental effect, Keller (2004a) concluded that a developmental theory of the moral self built on consistency between action choice and moral judgment could not be validated in cross-cultural research with Chinese children and adolescents. This questions also socialization theories that assume a universal developmental transformation from a selfish to a social disposition that is also inherent in Kohlberg's theory.
Concerning the feelings attributed to the protagonist/self in case of violating moral obligations or interpersonal responsibilities, the findings from previous research with Western children also could not be validated. Even the youngest Chinese children expected that whatever choice the protagonist/self made would result in negative feelings about this choice. Across development the Chinese seemed to experience intensive moral conflict because they interpreted the situation as a conflict of obligations of altruism and friendship. The Ice-landers seemed to interpret the situation across development as a conflict between self-interest and close friendship (Keller, 2004a; Keller & Edelstein, 1993) and with increasing age established consistency between moral judgment and action.
Moral feelings
This conclusion was also supported by the analysis of the feelings attributed to the protagonist/self as consequence of choice. Feelings were classified as positive (e.g. feeling good or happy) or negative (e.g. bad, unhappy, mixed feelings). Negative feelings were taken to indicate moral concerns when they resulted from empathy with the other person. The Chinese consistently argued that the protagonist would feel bad, independent of the direction of the choice. In contrast, the Icelandic children attributed negative feelings only when they opted for the new child (a choice that was mostly motivated by selfish interests and evaluated as not right). The older children attributed positive moral feelings when they opted for the friend (e.g. feeling good because this was the right thing to do), while the younger children frequently mentioned regret over the lost opportunity (e.g. feeling bad at the friend's house because it would have been more fun to see the movie) (Keller et al., 1996) . We interpreted this finding such that close friendship is a more dominant value with the Icelandic youth than it is for the Chinese. Even when Chinese adolescents gave priority to close friendship in adolescence, they still felt that the protagonist had failed his or her responsibility towards the new child. This again indicates that the Chinese experience interpersonal obligations stronger than Icelanders. They never were 'happy victimizers' but always 'unhappy moralists' (Oser, 2005) , living up to the expectations of others.
Conclusion
This chapter has discussed different aspects of normative development. Some of these aspects have been addressed in previous research, but mostly as separate research topics and not in an integrated theoretical framework. In this framework I have discussed the criteria that children and adolescents use when they justify obligations and responsibilities, both in a general and in a situation-specific way. I have further discussed the relationship between moral reasoning and action choices, in particular moral consistency as an indicator of a moral self. Finally the cognitive developmental research on moral feelings in case of violation of obligations and responsibilities has been outlined. I have argued that the previous focus on research with Western children and adolescents is too narrow establish an encompassing and culture-fair theory of normative development.
Our own empirical research on socio-moral reasoning about relationships and norms presented in this chapter tries to establish a broader framework by analyzing normative development in cultural context, including different components of moral reasoning in an action-theoretical framework. Socio-moral development is described in this framework as involving the descriptive understanding of actions, relationships and norms and the prescriptive evaluation of actions, people and relations in terms of moral norms and principles. The development of the different components of this theory is analysed empirically in a longitudinal study from childhood to adolescence in Iceland and in a cross-cultural comparison in China. The results of this study reveal a complex interaction of context, development and culture. While the developmental sequences of the concepts of social and moral reasoning are the same in both cultures, some stable differences obtain between contexts or issues in the two cultures. In line with other cross-cultural research, some of our findings support stable cultural differences between children from the two cultures, concerning the role of self-interest, interpersonal responsibilities and moral feelings. Some of our findings document that cultural differences are changing over time, such as the difference between moral duties and responsibilities in close friendship. In particular the social and moral importance of close friendship becomes strikingly similar in adolescence. This may indicate the universal importance of close friendship in adolescence. It should be pointed out however that in spite of these similarities the cultural meanings of close friendship may still be slightly different. Thus, while Icelandic adolescents see close friendship as an intimate personal relationship, Chinese adolescents emphasize the interconnection of friendship and society (Keller, 2004a) . Friends not only share each others' inner world and help each other with intimate problems but they also have the task of criticizing each other and of helping each other to become socially valuable members of society.
I finally want to mention that we found little variation in the different ecological contexts, such as city and rural children. One small difference concerned the effect that we also found in the not yet fully scored data of the longitudinal follow-up of our Chinese cross-sectional data. A first analysis of these time-lagged assessments reveals an effect that can be taken as an indicator of changes in socio-moral reasoning due to the rapid modernization and the capitalist-individualistic transformation of Chinese society. The most striking difference of the longitudinal follow-up study is a change from altruistic responsibility to more hedonistic self-interest in reasoning about the friendship dilemma: the children in the time-lagged sample used the category hedonistic self-interest much more frequently than altruistic responsibilities. This is consistent with the finding in the cross-sectional study, that the children from the most modernized school type which children of the elite attained also used hedonistic self-interest more frequently than the children from the two other settings. Thus, a modernization effect was already present at the earlier measurement occasion and became stronger in the time-lagged longitudinal study. Whether this indicates a general change in the normative orientation of youth is a question for future research. However, it is important to see that cultural change can affect the socio-moral reasoning of children even in a rather short timespan. This finding illustrates that normative development is both a universal and a socially dynamic process. When life-patterns changes children's socio-moral learning processes are affected and this is mirrored in what children see as important in morally relevant situations.
